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I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, five Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) are negotiating about 
membership in the European Union: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and the 
Slovak Republic. Although it can be assumed that their accession will be a time-consuming 
process with a long transition period, there is a broad consensus that it will eventually result 
in membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU). To achieve this goal, the countries 
have to fulfil several conditions (Maastricht criteria), the most important being that the annual 
inflation rate prior to the accession does not exceed the annual inflation rate in Euroland by 
more than 1.5 per cent and that the exchange rate between domestic currency and the Euro 
remains stable prior to accession.1 
Given that the economic policy assignment is correct, monetary policy is responsible for 
both conditions. Therefore, the exchange rate arrangement of the EU applicants plays an 
important – but not exclusive – role in their policy-mix. The history of transition economies 
as well as of other emerging markets illustrates that exchange rate policies as such are not a 
distinctive factor for the success and failure of monetary policy with respect to price stability. 
They have to be seen in a broader context; this is sometimes overlooked in the debate of 
appropriate exchange rate systems. Almost every possible exchange rate arrangement in 
transition countries was associated with both high and low inflation rates. Although in the 
long run, some of these countries will have to aim at a fixed exchange rate towards to the 
Euro (via ERM 2 or a similar arrangement) with its eventual adoption, obviously there is no 
one-size-fits-all exchange rate arrangement to meet the Maastricht criteria.  
In this paper, we therefore argue that there is no naturally superior exchange rate regime 
that can be applied to all advanced countries in transition when trying to meet the inflation 
criterion of the Maastricht Treaty. By way of contrast, an exchange rate arrangement is part of 
the monetary regime, which itself is a component of the economic order. The latter consists of 
both politically chosen and spontaneously evolved institutions. This leads to the hypothesis 
that the choice of an exchange rate arrangement in CEE is constrained by this institutional 
setting. This hypotheses will be developed and tested as follows. In section 2, we distinguish 
possible exchange rate arrangements for transition economies. In the third section, we will 
theoretically discuss the relation between exchange rate arrangement, monetary commitment 
and institutional factors. These considerations will be tested empirically for transition 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe in section IV. Lessons for those countries applying 
for EU membership will be drawn in section V. 
II. POTENTIAL EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES PRIOR TO EMU MEMBERSHIP 
In this section, we briefly recapitulate the properties of the most relevant exchange rate 
arrangements with respect to bringing down inflation on EMU level. One can think of several 
exchange rate arrangements for countries in transition to EMU. For one, the domestic 
                                                 
1 See Szapáry (2000) for a substantial critique of the Maastricht criteria, especially the inflation criterion, from 
a CEE perspective. 
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currency can float freely; it is not fixed to other currencies. The central bank can exclusively 
concentrate on the objective of price stability; it is not forced to consider the exchange rate. 
On the other hand, there is no external anchor, which allows to import stability. Second, the 
central bank intervenes occasionally to prevent excessive exchange rate fluctuations and to 
keep the exchange rate stable. This system is called managed floating. The problem is that the 
markets probably do not receive a clear signal about the strategy and intentions of the central 
bank.  
Third, the transition country can fix its currency to the Euro. For this regime to be 
successful it is not necessary to sign a formal international treaty. The transition country only 
has to announce that it fixes its exchange rate to the Euro and thereby uses this currency as a 
nominal anchor. This arrangement allows to import stability. 
Similarly, a country aiming at a disinflation process can fix its exchange rate to another 
currency, but depreciates its currency regularly and by a pre-announced rate (crawling peg), 
e.g. 1.5 per cent per month. A basic rate towards the reserve currency is set, with an 
exchange-rate band, e.g. ±10 per cent. There will be no intervention as long as the exchange 
rate does not fall short of this band on the market for foreign exchange. Every month or 
quarter, the currency will be depreciated by the fixed percentage. This is done by raising the 
base rate (in domestic currency per reserve currency). It is aimed at reducing the costs of 
disinflation by a crawling peg. Poland employed this regime until April 2000. 
Fifth, a currency board system (CBS) as an extreme form of an informal fixed-exchange-
rate arrangement has increasingly gained importance throughout the 1990s.2 When 
introducing a currency board, the government fixes the exchange rate towards a reserve 
currency and guarantees full convertibility of its own currency. Monetary policy is pursued by 
a monetary institution, which only has a couple of tasks. Whereas a central bank has a variety 
of monetary instruments, with which it can influence either quantities or prices on the market 
for money and credit, a currency board has none. It issues notes and coins exclusively against 
foreign currency. The board merely reacts to the supply or demand of market participants. 
The monetary base is fully backed by foreign exchange. Besides issuing money on demand 
the currency board has another duty. The reserve currency does not have to be held entirely in 
cash. The board can invest part of the reserves in order to earn interest payments. These can 
either be added to the reserves in order to protect the board from possible future losses3 or it 
can be handed to the government as additional revenues. It is self-evident that the board has 
to invest the foreign reserves in secure assets, which can be converted into cash very rapidly 
in case a large number of citizens wishes to cash in domestic notes and obtain foreign 
currency in cash. 
Therefore, the board has no control of the money supply in the country. It cannot act as a 
lender of last resort in case a commercial bank has liquidity problems or even goes bankrupt. 
This makes it highly necessary to introduce a prudential banking regulation (Baliño, Enoch et 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive description see Hanke and Schuler (1994). 
3 The West-African Currency Board (1913-1971) for instance created a backing of 110 per cent of the money 
base by adding seigniorage to the reserves (Schuler 1992, p. 59). Thereby, it tried to protect itself from losses 
from its portfolio.  
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al. 1997, pp. 20-23). The money supply can be made more regular and predictable if foreign 
banks are allowed or even encouraged to operate branches in the CBS country. A very 
important aspect of a CBS is the choice of the correct reserve currency. A currency board can 
import stability by fixing the exchange rate to the reserve currency.4 If a sound currency such 
as the US-dollar is chosen, a necessary condition for stability is fulfilled. For example, in 
1992, Estonia introduced a CBS (Bennett 1994), which is still in operation. 
A final form is eurosation5, which implies that the country does not issue its own currency. 
Instead, a foreign currency, the Euro, circulates and is used for all purposes, i.e. cash 
holdings, banking accounts, credits and so forth. In the context of this paper, eurosation is a 
deliberately chosen monetary regime, as opposed to cases, where, due to instability, another 
currency has driven out the official currency (Fontaine 2000). The country, in which only a 
foreign currency circulates cannot pursue its own monetary policy. It has no source of interest 
payments, which can be used for the public budget. Moreover, the fact that a country does not 
have its own currency is sometimes considered a disadvantage, since many people may regard 
the exclusive circulation of foreign exchange as somewhat humiliating.  
The choice of the appropriate exchange rate arrangement to guarantee stability and to 
enhance the chances of a fast accession to EMU is not easy. In the following section we 
analyse how the exchange rate arrangement is related to the monetary regime and the 
economic order and discuss the consequences of the relationship for the choice of the 
exchange rate system.  
III. EXCHANGE RATE REGIME, MONETARY COMMITMENT AND INSTITUTIONS: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Monetary policy and other policy areas are closely related. On average countries performing 
badly in one field, seldom function well in others. This shows that monetary performance 
cannot be judged separately from other policy areas. The monetary regime is a component of 
the economic order. In economic policymaking, a number of objectives have to be met. Price 
stability, full employment, growth are the most important ones. Politically, it is very tempting 
to try to meet several objectives with one policy variable. Policymakers may then hope to 
obtain a so-called double dividend.  
Monetary policy has been one of the most attractive policy instruments in the history of 
economic policymaking. It has been employed regularly to meet other policy objectives 
beside price level stability. On the contrary, price stability has often been neglected. Monetary 
policy has been abused as a means to enhance employment and output, to balance the public 
budget and to balance the current account. In transition economies, the considerable need for 
seigniorage has regularly been the most relevant cause for money growth and subsequent 
inflation (see also section IV). However, theoretical analysis as well as empirical evidence 
                                                 
4 Due to the Balassa-Samuelson-effect, the inflation rate in the currency board country can be higher than in 
the reserve country. 
5 In the literature, this is commonly defined as dollarisation.  
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show that it is practically impossible to meet this objective with the means monetary policy. 
The objective of price stability is also missed.  
Thus, it follows that economic policy in general is successful if every policy instrument 
were assigned to one policy target. For each policy objective, there is one agency, which 
decides on its policy instruments independent of the others (Tinbergen 1952). This has two 
advantages concerning the objective of combating severe inflation. The most important 
argument in favour of the Tinbergen rule is that it is a strong signal that the government is 
serious about separating the economic policy areas; the temptation to aim at a double 
dividend (e.g. an increase in seigniorage and stable prices) is resisted. Besides, the analytical 
problem of policymaking is neither under-determined nor over-determined. On the same 
token, if the components of economic order, e.g. the monetary regime, labour market 
regulation and the like are compatible with each other, monetary policy can concentrate on 
price stability.  
a)  Legal monetary commitment  
This has consequences for the design of monetary policy. To begin with, the monetary regime 
can be assessed with the help of legal measures such as the concept of central bank 
independence (CBI). The existing indices of CBI however have serious flaws as they do not 
consider external monetary relations. This is extremely important in the context of the 
problem at hand. Therefore, we employ a version of an alternative measure, the index of 
monetary commitment, which is more comprehensive than any measure of CBI (Freytag 
2001a). The index is constructed as the average of a number of components, along the lines 
leading indices have been built. For the problem at hand and due to difficulties to generate 
data, we have to proceed in two steps. First, select the most important components of the 
index, which are the following:  
Objectives of monetary policy. These may be restricted to price stability, but also my 
include other macroeconomic goals. In the latter case, commitment is lower (obj in Table 1).  
Conditions of lending to the government. This is a crucial component, as it shows whether 
or not monetisation of public budget deficits is excluded. If the central bank is not able to 
lend to the government, commitment is high (lim). 
Convertibility restrictions. These include convertibility for both current account and capital 
account transactions (conv). 
Public pledges of the government with respect to the exchange rate system. It is assumed 
that fixing the exchange rate to the Euro increases legal commitment. A ranking of the six 
different exchange rate arrangements discussed in section II is as follows keeping other 
components constant, the strongest commitment is eurosation, followed by a currency board, 
fixed exchange rates, a crawling peg, managed floating and, finally, freely floating exchange 
rates (extern). 
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Number of exchange rates. Multiple exchange rate show that the government intervenes 
discretionarily and diminishes the degree of commitment (mult).  
Table 1  
Index of commitment: a suggestion for codings 
Criterion Com-
ponen
t 
Explanation  Numerical 
codings 
Stated objectives of  obj 1. Price stability only goal 1.00
monetary policy 2. Other objectives mentioned 0.50
 3. No goals for monetary policy 0.00
Limitations on lending to 
the Government 
lim 1. Central Bank (CB) is prohibited to give 
credit to the public 
1.00
 2. CB is allowed to purchase public bonds 
in hard currency on the secondary market 
0.66
 3. CB is allowed to purchase public bonds 
in any currency on the secondary market 
and to give limited credit to the 
government 
0.33
 4. No government lending limitations  0.00
Convertibility Restrictions conv 1. Full convertibility 1.00
 2. Partial convertibility 0.75
 3. Convertibility for current account 
transactions only 
0.50
 4. Convertibility for capital account 
transactions only 
0.25
 5. No convertibility 0.00
Public pledges of the  extern 1. CBS 1.00
Government 2. Exchange rate fixed 0.75
 3. Crawling peg 0.50
 4. Managed floating 0.25
 5. No external pledge, free floating 0.00
Number of Exchange mult 1. One exchange rate 1.00
 2. Multiple exchange rates 0.00
Source: Freytag (2001a), own changes. 
 
The index of legal monetary commitment can be composed as an (unweighted or weighted) 
average of these components. In a second step, we distinguish those components directed to 
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internal commitment (IC) from those related to the exchange rate regime (ER). In Table 1, the 
latter are separated by the horizontal line after the component lim.6 
b) Restricting Institutions 
Of course, legal commitment is not equal to actual commitment. The case that the 
government does not abide by its commitment seems to be the rule rather than the exception. 
Even if the government is determined to stabilise the economy and to stop inflation, it may 
seem politically useful for it to deviate from the chosen commitment. This is where credibility 
enters the stage: the higher the credibility of the monetary regime is, the lower the deviation 
will be. Therefore, it is important to note that the degree of commitment does not necessarily 
correspond with the credibility of monetary policy. It is not meant to measure actual 
commitment. Instead, the index focuses on legal determinants of commitment. In other 
words: the index measures what governments promise instead of to what extent governments 
keep their promises. 
Following this reasoning, a monetary regime is more credible and successful, if it is 
compatible with the other institutional factors in the country. They are constraints for the 
design of components of the economic order. These constraints can be the result of a 
purposeful process of policymaking, just as discussed above. Or they emanate spontaneously 
without an official mandate. Such institutional constraints are to be considered when the 
exchange rate regime is decided upon to meet the Maastricht criterion on inflation. We 
identify five relevant institutional factors determining the comprehensive economic order 
(Freytag 2001b):  
• Political stability gives evidence about the robustness of the political system. High 
stability implies that a political system is stable rather than long-term survival of a party 
in government.  
• An indicator of Fiscal stability shows whether or not a government can keep the public 
budget balanced. Ideally, it should not be based exclusively on historical performance.  
• Labour market flexibility is ideally measured by an index giving evidence of the duration 
of unemployment and the speed, with which structural change is managed on the labour 
market.  
• Openness of the country shows whether or not the world market price structures are valid 
in the country. It is usually restricted to trade (exports plus imports). 
• Public attitude to inflation displays the sensibility of the public as regards inflation. It is 
comprised of past experience and actual regulations. The former inflation record is 
especially relevant for a country after a hyperinflation. People are very sensitive as regards 
stability: since they know the cost of inflation on average they strongly oppose another 
                                                 
6 In Table 1 as well as in the empirical section, eurosation is missing, for it is not applied in the sample.  
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hyperinflation. Elements determining this institution are past inflationary experience, 
indexation and price freezes. In transition economies, however, the past inflation 
experience may be too little to form a collective memory.  
The first factor (political stability) is a summary of the formal and informal rules that affect 
the way, in which the political system in general responds to incentives and constraints. The 
second, third and fourth institutional factors regard other relevant fields of economic policy. 
Nevertheless, they indirectly influence most governments in their decision on whether or not 
allowing for inflation. The fifth factor (public attitude to inflation) shows how much the 
public responds to an inflationary bias of policymakers. It seems necessary to take into 
account the comprehensive institutional setting. In other words: it would not be satisfactory to 
concentrate on single aspects, i.e. single institutions.  
However, it turns out to be impossible to calculate meaningful institutional indicators for 
transition countries. Therefore, the institutional setting can be mirrored by several indices of 
economic freedom existing in the literature. We introduce four of them: 
• The study by Johnson, Holmes and Kirkpatrick (1999) applies ten criteria to measure 
economic freedom of 160 countries. These concern the regulation of the following areas: 
trade policy, taxation, government intervention in the economy, monetary policy, capital 
flows and foreign investment, banking, wage and price controls, property rights, (general) 
regulation, and black market activities (ibid., pp. 51-68). The authors compare the period 
1996 through 1998, which does not cover the time span of our analysis. 
• The survey of “Freedom in the World” (Freedom House 2001) is restricted to two series 
of questions: one regarding political rights and one regarding civil liberties. Each country 
or territory considered is assigned a rating for each category. Both ratings are averaged 
and used to assign each country and territory to an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” 
or “Not Free.” This categories are not precise enough. They may serve as an addition to 
institutional factors.  
• The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has introduced the 
EBRD Liberalisation index (Fidrmuc 2000). It describes the average progress in 
liberalisation in transition countries and consists of the following components: 
privatisation, price liberalisation, enterprise restructuring, trade and foreign exchange 
liberalisation, competition policy, banking reform, securities market and legal rules on 
investment. Thus, it can be used as an approximation of the institutional setting. 
• The index of economic freedom as constructed by Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000). 
is based on 23 criteria summarised in the seven following groups: size of government, 
structure of the economy, monetary policy, freedom to use alternative currencies, legal 
structure and property rights, international exchange, international capital mobility.7 The 
authors calculate the economic freedom of 123 countries between 1975 and 1997. 
Naturally, to be useful for the goal of our analysis, the criteria for monetary policy and 
                                                 
7 For the weighting see Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000, p. 7).  
ICEG EC Working Paper A. Freytag: Accession to EMU and Exchange Rate Policies in Central Europe 
 
11 
freedom to use foreign currencies have to be eliminated from the index since monetary 
commitment has already been considered. Moreover, it is necessary to avoid statistical 
interference. This is the most comprehensive and widely used index, acknowledged by the 
literature (e.g. Henderson 1999). Therefore, we use it for our empirical section. We also 
test for the EBRD Liberalisation index. 
c) The theory 
These considerations shall be explored further in the following. We assume that a new 
exchange rate regime is introduced to (further) reduce Imagine an objective function of the 
government depending positively on seigniorage S and negatively on costs of inflation φ, 
which in turn depend on both actual and expected inflation (Barro 1983). The policymaker’s 
problem is given by: 
(1) 
π
ππφδ max),( →−= eSZ ,  
 where: 0>
π
φ
d
d  and 0>ed
d
π
φ . 
The weight the government places on seigniorage in (1) is denoted by δ with 0≥δ . The 
smaller the value of δ, the higher the acceptance of the need for price level stability. We set 
)exp()( 2αππ −==≡ mmL
P
M
M
MS e

 (Cagan 1956). Since we are taking a long term 
perspective and due to the Fisher equation, we can set m= π . We further define 
))(exp( 2 ek ππφ +=  where k(πe) describes the costs of expected inflation. Increasing 
expected inflation raises the political costs associated with inflationary expectations. The 
government takes the expected inflation rate as given. The fact that actual inflation is 
introduced into the cost function in a quadratic form takes into account the costs of deflation 
as well. Thus the objective function becomes: 
(2) ))(exp()exp( 2 ee kZ ππαπδπ +−−= . 
The costs of commitment k(πe) can be interpreted as a function of the difference between 
the degree of commitment C (consisting of both internal and external components) and the 
institutional setting (IS) calculated as the average of the institutional factors i. As a 
convention, they are restricted between 0 and 1 (Cukierman 1992, chapter 19). The costs are 
the higher, the smaller the difference is between the level of commitment C and the average 
level of the institutional factors IFi ( nIFIS i /∑= ). Whereas in case of the index of 
commitment, a value close to zero (one) implies low (high) commitment, in case of IS a value 
close to zero (one) indicates low (high) compatibility of the institutional setting with high 
commitment. Low (high) compatibility leads to the probability of a good monetary 
performance being low (high). We have chosen an absolute form to make sure that the 
summand is positive. As a result of (2), the costs of commitment decrease when compared to 
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the highest costs not only if the degree of commitment is too low, but also if it is too high. To 
properly take these into account, we specify the costs of commitment as follows: 
(3) 
ISC
k e
−
=
1)( π , 
The economic reason for this specification is that the public has rational expectations and is 
well informed about the interaction of monetary commitment and other institutions. It 
recognises deviations from an economically sound design of the monetary regime under given 
constraints and adjusts its expectations adequately. This has consequences for the consistency 
of a monetary regime. Equation (3), therefore, has another interesting property. The 
expression ISC −/1  can be interpreted as a proxy for credibility. Credibility does not only 
depend on the degree of commitment, but also on the compatibility of commitment and 
institutional framework in the country. The lower the absolute difference between the two 
values is, the higher the credibility of the monetary regime will be and vice versa. Thus, here 
we have an ex-ante proxy for credibility, which is important for policy conclusions. It enables 
the policymaker to assess the credibility of a monetary reform in advance.8 The economic 
logic of the proxy can be made intuitively clear by a simple example: imagine a very strong 
monetary commitment, e.g. a currency board, which does not leave discretionary leeway for 
the government. Suppose at the same time very corporatist wage negotiations, valid for all 
industries on a national level. If this regime is not subject to a turn towards more flexibility, a 
tight monetary policy will probably cause unemployment to rise. Then, unemployment may 
become unbearable for the government. The latter may feel the need to abandon the currency 
board; the monetary regime fails. 
Finally, let us determine the optimal inflation rate of a policymaker under commitment. 
Equation (2) and (3) can be maximised with respect to π. Maximisation of Z leads to: 
(4) )1exp(2 2
ISCP
M
−
+= ππδ . 
Equation (4) can be rearranged into: 
(5) 
ISC
PM
−
−+=+
1)/ln(ln2ln 2 δππ . 
The higher the credibility is, i.e. the better the monetary regime acknowledges institutional 
constraints, the lower the politically optimal inflation rate will be. A high inclination for 
seigniorage and a high demand for real balance is likely to increase the inflation rate. These 
results are in line with the macroeconomic literature.  
What does this imply for the appropriate exchange rate regimes in advanced transition 
countries. As it is one component of the measure of legal commitment, an exchange rate 
                                                 
8 By way of contrast, other proxies used for credibility are ex-post measures, which can only be applied after 
the reform has been made. See e.g. Blackburn and Christensen (1989, pp. 35-40). 
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arrangement does not exclusively distinguish success and failure in reform by itself. 
Nevertheless, they play a role when determining the credibility of the monetary regime. They 
can raise legal monetary commitment and enhance the credibility if the commitment fits the 
institutional setting. To separate the exchange rate arrangement from the other components of 
economic order, we rearrange the index of commitment as follows: ERICC )1( ββ −+= , 
where IC denotes the internal aspects of monetary commitment and ER those related to the 
exchange rate arrangement; ß is the weight given to the internal aspects. Equation 3 can be 
rearranged in the following way. 
(6) 
ISERIC
k e
−−+
=
))1((
1)( ββπ , 
Equation (6) illustrates more clearly than before that the choice of the exchange rate 
arrangement (ER) – commonly with other elements of economic order – determines the 
credibility of the monetary regime and, thus, the politically optimal inflation rate. Given the 
objective of long-term stability for Central European countries, this is a very important 
hypothesis based on the theoretical reasoning. In the following section, this hypothesis will be 
tested empirically. 
IV. EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE: THE APPROPRIATE CHOICE? 
a) The choice of exchange rate regimes in CEE 
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe have opted for very different exchange rate 
arrangements. Moreover, most of them have changed the arrangement at least once since the 
beginning of the transition period. This can either reflect a high degree of uncertainty of the 
policymakers or an institutional change, which also has lead to an adjustment of the exchange 
rate policy.  
However, the motivation for the choice of an exchange rate arrangement is not in the focus 
of our analysis. We are interested in an answer to the question of whether or not it enhances 
stabilisation if the exchange rate is properly embedded into the economic order. For an 
empirical test of the hypothesis expressed in equation (5), an econometric model has to be 
created based on the theoretical considerations. The sample consists of all exchange rate 
arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe since the beginning of transition. The 
arrangements, which have been chosen by the countries in transition since 1991, can be seen 
in Table 2.  
Table 2  
Exchange rate arrangements in CEE countries (April 2000) 
Country Change in the Exchange Rate Regime Year 
Bosnia and Herzegowina Currency Board 1997* 
Bulgaria independent floating 1991* 
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 Currency Board 1997* 
Croatia independent floating 1993* 
Czech Republic Peg 1991* 
 managed floating 1997* 
Estonia Currency Board 1992* 
Hungary crawling peg 1995* 
Latvia flexible exchange Rate 1992* 
Lithuania fixed exchange rate (to the rouble) 1992 
 Currency Board 1994* 
Macedonia independent floating 1992* 
 conventional pegged arrangement 1994* 
Poland crawling band 1995* 
 floating 2000 
Romania managed floating 1991* 
Russia fixed exchange rate 1994* 
 managed floating 1998* 
Slowak Republic fixed exchange rate 1993* 
 managed floating 1998* 
Slovenia managed floating 1991* 
*  included in the sample for the empirical test. 
Source: Fischer (2001), IMFa, IMFb. 
 
b) Data restrictions 
Table 2 consists of 21 exchange rate regime switches taking place in the 1990s, of which 19 
are used in the econometric assessment. As mentioned earlier, we restrict the index of 
commitment to the five components shown in Table 1. We are also unable to generate all data 
required for the institutional factors. Thus, we construct a restricted index IC, consisting of 
four components (obj, lim, conv and mult). In addition, the external relationship (ER)is 
expressed through the component extern. The institutional setting will be represented by the 
index of economic freedom (EF) as well as the EBRD Liberalisation index. 
c) The variables 
Equation (5) has to be rearranged for the theoretical considerations to be tested empirically. 
The endogenous variable is the natural log of the consumer price inflation (CPI) in the period 
t+1 to t+3 after the regime switch, in some cases it has to be restricted to two periods (see 
Table 2). This choice reflects the dynamics of the disinflation process. Following equation 
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(6), credibility is expressed as the absolute difference between monetary commitment 
( ERIC + ) and the institutional setting in the form of the index of economic freedom (EF) 
and the EBRD Liberalisation (EBRD)index respectively. Both are composed of different 
aspects  
of economic order and restricted between 0 and 1.9 We calculate the ex-ante proxy for 
credibility based on EF and EBRD as )*4.0*6.0( EFERICCREDEF −+=  and 
)*4.0*6.0( EBRDERICCREDEBRD −+=  respectively with 2/lim)( += objIC  and 
)*2.0*2.0*6.0( multconvexternER ++=  (see Table 1). The expression )/ln(ln PM+δ in 
equation (5) will be approximated by the share of money growth in the public revenues for 
the period t+1 to t+3 after the regime switch (or shorter, depending on the data). This is a 
common proxy for seigniorage.10 Therefore, the basic econometric equation for a cross-
section analysis is given in equation (7): 
(7) ε+++= SEIGNßCREDßßCPI EBRDEF 2)(10 , 
where ),0(ND~ 2εσε . CPI denotes inflation after the introduction of the new exchange rate 
arrangement, CRED stands for the ex-ante measure of credibility and SEIGN for seigniorage. 
Theoretically, one would expect a negative sign for the credibility variable and a positive sign 
for SEIGN. In a second step, we test whether the elements of the ex-ante proxy for credibility 
on their own have a positive impact on monetary stability. Equation 8 is a similar approach, 
adding up the single elements: 
(8) ε+++++= SEIGNßEBRDEFßERßCßßCPI 43210 )(  
d) The econometric results 
The estimations of equations (7) and (8) are reported in Table 3. Estimations 1 and 2 are 
directed to the core of the theoretical analysis of the paper. They show the expected signs, 
although the parameter of CRED is insignificant. Seigniorage is significant and can explain 
the dynamics of inflation. Estimations 3 through 5 show that the importance of institutions 
can be better highlighted if the additive approach of equation (8) is applied. They also show 
that internal monetary commitment (IC) as defined in Table 1 cannot explain a disinflation 
process when combined with institutions. Estimations 6 and 7 make clear that the exchange 
rate regime can only explain a small part of the monetary performance in CEE countries. 
Although the commonly held view that external commitment can improve the monetary 
performance cannot be rejected on the basis of this regression, it is clear that there is no a 
priori superior exchange rate system for the purpose to reduce inflation. Estimations 8 
through 11 control for the importance of institutions. Economic freedom as approximation 
and liberalisation as proxies for the economic order can restrict the policymakers 
discretionary power to increase inflation. In general. the EBRD variable explains the 
                                                 
9 In our sample, these indicators are highly correlated with each other (correlation coefficient: 0.64) and to a 
much lesser extent with IC and ER (correlation coefficients between 0.08 and 0.38). 
10 For methodical details see Freytag (2001b). For a critique see Klein and Neumann (1990) as well as 
Neumann (1992). 
ICEG EC Working Paper A. Freytag: Accession to EMU and Exchange Rate Policies in Central Europe 
 
16 
disinflation process better, which may be due to the dynamic properties of this index.11. 
Finally, the variable SEIGN is significant for inflation. This result confirms conventional 
wisdom.  
Table 3  
Credibility of exchange rate regimes in CEE: the econometric results1 
Estimation CRED ER IC EF EBRD SEIGN R²adj N 
1 -1.3²   0.09*** 0.16 16 
2 -2.13³   -0.1** 0.25 17 
3 -1.25 2.49** -5.52  0.09** 0.37 16 
4 -1.57* 2.41*** -4.59** 0.07* 0.51 17 
5 -1.73** 2.32***  0.1** 0.33 17 
6 -1.33 -0.22   0.03 19 
7 -1.45   0.09 19 
8  -6.12***  0.33 18 
9  -7.25**   0.25 16 
10  -4.71* 0.07* 0.44 17 
11  -5.93*  0.07** 0.36 16 
1 Cross-sectional OLS-regression applying the White heteroscedasticity test;  
² CREDEF;  
³ CREDEBRD. The estimations are made with EViews3. The absolute (ß0) is not reported. 
*, **,***  significant at 10 per cent level, 5 per cent level, 1 per cent level respectively. 
Source: IMFa, IMFb, IMFc. Central bank laws have been downloaded from the internet. See 
Institute for Economic Policy 2001, Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000), Fidrmuc 
(2000), own calculations. 
 
To summarise, although to be treated extremely cautiously, the results can be called 
promising in that they show the relevance of institutions for the appropriate choice of the 
exchange rate arrangement for CEE countries, if monetary stabilisation is the goal of 
monetary policy including exchange rate policy. At the same time, they show that the 
reservations against the empirical application concept of central bank independence for others 
than industrialised countries (Eijjfinger and de Haan 1996) are sensitive, as IC displays the 
expected sign only when commonly estimated with ER and without other exogenous 
variables (estimation 5). However, the coefficient of determination R²adj in this case is 
extremely low. In addition the significant positive sign of IC in the other equation is difficult 
to explain. 12 
                                                 
11 The EBRD Liberalisation index has explicit dynamic properties, as it is meant to document progess in 
libralisation. Therefore, we do not use it for the credibility measure, but for other estimations. 
12 It can mean a misspecification of commitment as analysed by Posen (1993): commitment as well as 
institutions are influenced by a third unknown variable. This problem remains an open question for further 
research with better data. As it is not in the focus of this paper, we end the discussion here. 
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V. SOME LESSONS FOR THE CEE COUNTRIES 
This analysis has confirmed the view that exchange rate arrangements are important, but not 
exclusively relevant for the success of a monetary reform. Fixing the exchange rate to a hard 
currency is likely to raise the degree of legal monetary commitment. The theoretical 
considerations as well as empirical evidence suggest that beside the legal monetary 
commitment the institutional framework in the country is decisive. If the latter matches the 
commitment, the credibility of a new monetary regime is relatively high, obviously 
encouraging monetary stability. 
The result of both the theoretical and empirical part of this analysis does not come as a 
surprise. For instance, Eichengreen, Masson et al. (1998, pp. 20-23) draw similar conclusions 
concerning the criteria for the choice of an exchange rate system. They distinguish floating 
exchange rates (pure and managed), target bands, a crawling peg, a CBS and a currency 
union. The criteria for the choice of an adequate exchange-rate system are the following: 
inflation, level of reserves, capital mobility, labour mobility and nominal flexibility, trade 
integration, political integration, and preponderance of shocks. The general conclusion is that 
compatibility of the exchange rate regime with these components of economic order makes 
the exchange rate regime potentially successful. 
The analyses has consequences for the choice of an appropriate exchange rate arrangement 
in those Central European Countries striving for EMU membership. First, each country 
should be analysed extensively along the lines offered in this research project – in particular 
in the country studies – before an exchange rate arrangement is chosen. The results secondly 
make it necessary to analyse carefully whether another policy option for the Central European 
countries – a common strategy with a floating or fixed exchange rate towards the Euro – is 
appropriate. The latter is similar to an EMS II (Jochem and Sell 2001). In any case, this 
option implies fixed exchange rates of the Central European currencies towards each other, 
which needs more analysis beforehand.  
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